In this paper we examine three sets of explanations for the outcome of the 1996 presidential election campaign. First, we look at the e ects of voter perceptions of the national economy on voter support for Clinton. Second we look at the e ects of candidate and voter positions on a number of issues and on ideology. Last, we seek to understand whether other issues | social issues such as abortion as well as issues revolving around entitlements and taxation | played signi cant roles in this election. Thus this work extends the work of Alvarez and Nagler (1995), and enriches it with analysis of a more comprehensive set of issues considered. In the end, we are able to pull together each of these di erent sets of explanations into a consistent analysis of the 1996 presidential election which shows why Clinton won this race, but which also helps us understand why it was that both Dole and Perot fell so far from electoral victory. This is one of many joint papers by the authors on multiparty elections, the ordering of their names re ects alphabetic convention. We thank Tara Butter eld and Garrett Glasgow for their comments.
In November, 1996, Bill Clinton easily won reelection | the rst Democratic president since the Great Depression to be sent back to the White House for a second term. Thus, while it is signi cant academic interest to understand what the factors were which led to Clinton's reelection victory in 1996 to enhance our models of voting, it is also of great substantive importance to understand what the speci c factors were which drove so many American voters to reelect a Democratic president for a second term in o ce.
For almost the last half{century, academic interest has focused on the determinants of presidential elections. In general, both scholarly and popular discussions of presidential election determinants has focused on three di erent factors: the state of the economy, the positions of voters and candidates on the issues, and on the ability of candidates to conduct e ective campaigns for o ce. In recent years, much interest has focused on the importance of the national economy as a signi cant factor in accounting for both the success of three Republican presidential candidates during the 1980's as well as Clinton's rst victory in 1992 (Fiorina 1981; Kiewiet 1983; Alvarez and Nagler 1995; Markus 1988; Rosenstone 1983; Tufte 1978 ).
But at the same time, many in both academic and popular circles have pointed to a number of non{economic factors as potentially important features of presidential politics. For example, in recent years social issues may have risen in importance as factors in presidential politics, most especially the issues of abortion and anger with Washington and the federal government. Social issues are not new to American presidential elections; McGovern was tagged with the`3 A's' | Amnesty, Abortion, and Acid | in 1972 . But what is perhaps new is the organizational resources devoted around social issues with the rise of the right{wing of the Republican party. Also, the more general notions of liberal and conservative ideology have been seen as possibly important issues in recent presidential campaigns, ranging from Bush's attacks on Dukakis's liberalism in the 1988 campaign to Clinton's more recent "New Democratic" ideology. So there are strong reasons to believe that both issues and ideology were probably important factors in the 1996 presidential election as they have been in previous elections (Abramson et al. 1983 (Abramson et al. , 1987 (Abramson et al. , 1990 (Abramson et al. , 1994 Carmines and Stimson 1980; Jackson 1975; Key 1966; Page and Brody 1972; Pomper 1972) .
Another reason we nd the 1996 presidential race to be of interest is the presence of Perot as 1 a non{major party candidate. While in 1992 Perot received almost 20% of the popular vote, by 1996 his popular vote was cut in half. While there were many accounts for Perot's showing in the 1992 election (Abramson et al. 1995; Alvarez and Nagler 1995; Zaller and Hunt 1994) , it is important to determine what factors drove Perot's support to less than 10% in 1996. However, studying presidential elections when there are three potentially viable candidates is both theoretically and methodologically challenging. A three{candidate presidential race is more di cult to model theoretically and empirically since the assumptions of the models we usually apply to two{ candidate races in both the standard two{candidate theoretical models of elections and the simple methodological techniques used to study two{candidate races (usually logit or probit models) may be incorrect and inferences drawn from them could be error{prone. Here we use a relatively new methodological technique, multinomial probit, to study this three{candidate race which minimizes the restrictive assumptions we need to make in order to estimate a model of voter choice.
In this paper we examine three sets of explanations for the outcome of the 1996 presidential election campaign. First, we look at the e ects of voter perceptions of the national economy on voter support for Clinton. Second we look at the e ects of candidate and voter positions on a number of issues and on ideology. Last, we seek to understand whether other issues | social issues such as abortion as well as issues revolving around entitlements and taxation | played signi cant roles in this election. Thus this work extends the work of Alvarez and Nagler (1995) , and enriches it with analysis of a more comprehensive set of issues considered. In the end, we are able to pull together each of these di erent sets of explanations into a consistent analysis of the 1996 presidential election which shows why Clinton won this race, but which also helps us understand why it was that both Dole and Perot fell so far from electoral victory.
Issues and Economics in Presidential Elections

A First Look at the Data
In Table 1 we begin testing these various explanation for voter choice in the 1996 presidential election. We provide a simple crosstabulation showing the relationship between the voters' perceptions of the economy; their partisanship, gender and past voting behavior; and last, a number of measures of their preferences on social and entitlement issues and support for each of the three major candidates (Perot, Dole, and Clinton). Table 1 Goes Here We begin by examining the respondent's perceptions of both their own personal nances and the national economy in the past year and how that is related to their candidate preferences. 1 First, of those voters who thought their own personal nancial situation had worsened in the past year, most were Dole supporters (47%) but not by a great margin over Clinton, since 44% of those who believed their own nancial situation had worsened over the past year voted for Clinton. This low margin is in fact quite interesting because Clinton was much more successful with this group of voters in his 1992 challenge. Clinton received the votes of 58.1% of voters who felt the economy was worse o , and Bush retained only 21.5% of these voters (Alvarez and Nagler 1995) . However, the situation changes when we look to the voters who found that their personal nancial situation had improved in the past year | they are overwhelming supporters of Clinton (62%). But second, the e ects of retrospective evaluations of the national economy seem to have an even stronger e ect on candidate preference than do retrospective evaluations of personal nances in Table 1 , which is consistent with the conventional wisdom (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981) . We see that those voters who believed that the national economy had grown much worse in the past year were very likely to be Dole voters (57%) and even a sizable number of these voters supported Perot (13%). Yet the situation reverses itself when we look to those who believed that that national economy had gotten better in the past year: fully 71% of those voters supported Clinton, 23% supported Dole, and only 6% supported Perot. Therefore, from these simple statistics we have strong support for the hypothesis that perceptions of the national economy and a respondent's personal nancial condition might be signi cant determinants of voter choice in this presidential election.
We provide next in Table 1 the breakdown of vote choice based on partisanship, past political participation, and gender. Not surprisingly, professed Republicans were strong supporters of Dole (79%); however 21% of the stated Republicans "defected" to support Clinton or Perot. While Clinton was able to draw signi cant support from stated Republicans, notice furthermore that he was able to keep Democrats from "defecting" to a much larger extent | Clinton received the votes of 88% of the Democrats in our sample, a full nine percent lower defection rate than Dole could maintain. This was also 18% higher than Bush's retention rate in 1992: when only 70% of Republicans voted for Bush. Last, while stated independents roughly split between Clinton and Dole, many (20%) supported Perot's third party candidacy.
Next, we nd little support for any sort of strategic mobilization e ort of new voters by either Perot or Dole. Of those who did not vote in the 1992 presidential election, most actually supported Clinton in 1996 (58%). Thus it seems that like the 1992 election, Perot did not mobilize large groups of alienated and disa ected voters to enter the political process.
Evidence for the well{documented gender gap in support for presidential candidates is provided in the next rows of Table 1 . Male voters were slightly more inclined to support Clinton than Dole (a di erence of roughly 2%). Yet men were slightly more likely to vote for Perot than women, continuing a pattern we observed in the 1992 election (Alvarez and Nagler 1995) . But female voters were vastly more likely to vote for Clinton than for Dole, with 60% of the females in our sample supporting Clinton and only 34% supporting Dole. This gender gap, 23.9%, could have been driven largely by the di erences in preferences on social and economic issues, and probably by di erences in partisanship, between men and women (Chaney et al. 1997) . In any case, it is clear from these results that both partisanship and gender are important bivariate predictors of candidate support in the 1996 election.
Last we provide the breakdown of candidate support by the responses to four important issues: abortion, welfare and social security cuts, and one of the important issues discussed by the Dole campaign, the 15% tax cut. As far as abortion is concerned, we see in Table 1 that pro{life voters were strong supporters of Dole (55%) while pro{choice voters were strong supporters of Clinton (68%); this indicates that the electorate was slightly more polarized on the abortion issue than they were in 1992, since in that election 48% of pro{lifers supported Bush and 57% of the pro{choice voters supported Clinton (Abramowitz 1995; Alvarez and Nagler 1995) . Perot's support does not appear to vary much amongst the di erent camps of opinion. We nd similar patterns when we look at both welfare and social security cuts: those who wished to see cuts in either entitlement program were strong supporters of Dole (52% and 69% respectively).
As to the e ects of the Dole 15% tax cut, it seems clear that those who were in favor of a tax cut of that magnitude were strong supporters of Dole, since 67% of those who favored at least a 15% tax cut voted for Dole. Of those who opposed such a tax cut, most voters overwhelmingly voted for Clinton (54%). Surprisingly, for a candidate who had campaigned on the issue of the federal budget de cit in the previous election, those who opposed the 15% tax cut were only slightly more likely to support Perot than those who favored a 15% tax cut.
One of the other major accounts for both of Clinton's presidential election victories focuses on overall ideological position. Conventional wisdom has asserted that Clinton's e orts to de ne himself and his party as \New Democrats" were largely successful and were a large part of Clinton's ability to win in 1992 and 1996. Alvarez and Nagler cast considerable doubt on the \New Democrat" hypothesis, largely since they were able to show that American voters did not seem to see Clinton as an ideological moderate (Alvarez and Nagler 1995) . In Table 2 we update the data presented in Alvarez and Nagler's 1995 paper. Here we give the mean ideological placements for voters and the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates for 1988, 1992, 1994 and 1996. 2 We also give the sample mean ideological placement for Perot in 1992{96. Last we also compute the average distance between the voters in our sample and each candidate.
Table 2 Goes Here
We see in the rst row of Table 2 that the American electorate in 1994 was virtually ideologically identical to the electorate in 1992; but the ideological distribution of voters shifts slightly to the right in 1996. Thus, the American electorate was slightly more conservative in 1996 than in the previous two elections. Yet, turning to the candidate's positions over these elections, we see a remarkable amount of similarity | not change. While voters saw Bush as slightly more liberal in 1992 than 1988, they saw Dole as slightly more conservative in 1996 than Bush. Yet since in 1996 voters were slightly more conservative than in 1992, this implies that Dole was actually no closer or further from most voters than Bush had been in 1992.
Clinton, though, had been seen in 1992 as more liberal than Dukakis had been in 1988. After the signi cant political events in the rst two years of Clinton's rst administration, we might have expected that the voters could have learned more about Clinton's "New Democratic" policies | and hence voters should have seen Clinton as being more conservative in 1994 than in 1992. Yet we observe exactly the opposite in Table 2 ; Clinton was seen as slightly more liberal in 1994 and 1996 than in 1992. With the electorate becoming slightly more conservative in 1996 than in 1992, this actually implies that Clinton was slightly further from the electorate in 1996 than he had been in earlier elections. Thus there seems to be little support for the assertion that Clinton was seen as a moderate, \New Democrat"; in each of the three years 1992-1996 voters saw Clinton as more liberal than they had seen Mike Dukakis.
In the last two rows of Table 2 we give the same information for placement of Perot. We see a slight movement in Perot placement to the right, between 1992 and 1996. Perot was seen as somewhat more conservative in 1996 than in 1992. But again, since the electorate became somewhat more conservative between 1992 and 1996 as well, this means that Perot was actually in roughly the same location relative to most voters in 1996 as he had been in 1992.
Multivariate Analysis of the 1996 Presidential Election
The problem, though, with the proceeding analysis is that it is impossible to di erentiate amongst the competing explanations for Clinton's 1996 reelection by looking only at bivariate relationships. To better test these di erent explanations requires a multivariate methodology which will give us the ability to determine the relative e ects of individual characteristics and candidate position on issues in a three{candidate election. We want to use the multivariate model which imposes the 6 fewest restrictions; therefore we use the multinomial probit model to produce multivariate estimates of the relative e ects of these many di erent factors on vote choice in the 1996 presidential election (Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 1997) .
The multinomial probit model we use here is very similar to the model used in Alvarez and Nagler's analysis of the 1992 election (Alvarez and Nagler 1995) . 3 We estimate separate coe cients which relate individual characteristics of each respondent to their preference for each candidate. We also estimate single coe cients for the most important candidate{speci c we can measure in the survey data we use: ideological{ and issue{distances of each candidate from each voter.
Following standard practice (Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 1997; Hausman and Wise 1978) we de ne the random utility for each voter for the three candidates in the 1996 election as:
where a i is a vector of characteristics unique to each individual voter i, X ij is a matrix of characteristics k unique to candidate j (j = 1; 2; 3) with respect to each voter, j and are coe cient vectors and " ij is a disturbance term. As is usually the case with random utility models, we assume that individuals vote for the candidate who brings them the highest utility. Under the multinomial probit model we assume that the three random utility error terms are distributed multivariate normal. Last, we assume that the three diagonal elements of the error variance{covariance matrix (the three error variances) are homoskedastic, a normalization which allows us to estimate various remaining error covariances. 4 In this multinomial probit speci cation, we estimate one coe cient for each alternative characteristic; thus we estimate only one parameter for each of the issue and ideological distance measures we have in our model. But, for individual characteristics, we estimate (J ? 1) coe cients for each characteristic, with J being the number of choices in the model. Since there are only three choices in the model we present below, that means we will estimate two coe cient vectors. One of these sets of coe cients gives the e ect of a particular individual characteristic on the relative choice of Clinton and Perot; the other set of coe cients gives the e ect of an individual characteristic on the relative choice of Dole and Perot. We give more details on the multinomial probit model and we discuss estimation issues in the appendix to this paper.
The data we use to estimate the model is the same we used in Table 1 : the 1996 American National Election Study (Rosenstone, Kinder, and Miller 1996) . In their work on the 1992 election, Alvarez and Nagler were only able to operationalize ideological distance between the three candidates and each voter, since there was no issue placement information for Perot in the 1992 study. In the 1996 data, however, respondents in the rst two (of four) sample replicates were asked to place Perot on a wide range of seven point issue scales (government services, defense spending, government jobs, aid to blacks, crime reduction, and environmental regulation); the entire sample was asked to place Perot on the ideological scale. Thus we are able to model a number of di erent candidate{speci c variables. Below we rst estimate a model which essentially replicates Alvarez and Nagler's model of the 1992 election, with only the ideological distance of the voter from each candidate (Alvarez and Nagler 1995) . We then estimate a model which contains ideological distances as well as all of the issue distances just listed. The measure of ideological or issue distance we employ is the squared di erence between the respondent's self placement on the respective NES seven point issue or ideological scale and the candidate's mean placement on the same scale by all of the survey respondents.
Moving to the other independent variables in our multinomial probit models, we included each of the measures in Table 1 as individual{level characteristics. Thus, we have included measures of the respondent's opinion of the change in their personal nances over the past year and their opinion on the change in the national economy during that same time. Both of these measures are coded with optimistic answers the high category.
Next we include measures for opinions on whether both welfare and social security should be increased, kept the same, or cut (both variables were coded in that order | with the conservative answers the higher values). We also included opinions on the Dole 15% tax cut (a binary variable coded such that agreement with Dole on this issue was the high category). Additionally we control for the e ects of government health insurance opinions by including the respondent's opinion on the seven point scale (conservative answers were coded high). Last we measured respondents' opinions about abortion policy by using responses from a question which asked respondents which of four abortion options best represented their beliefs on abortion policy, with pro{choice coded high.
We also include a series of other measures which measure individual characteristics which might have in uenced voter choice in the 1996 presidential election. We have dummy variables for Republican and Democratic identi cation (with Independent identi cation being the baseline category). Also, there are measures for the respondent's educational attainment (years of schooling), gender (females were coded high), age (three dummy variables), and region (dummy variables for West, South and East).
This speci cation of our multinomial probit models provides us with the means to test the three major competing propositions concerning the determinants of voter choice in the 1996 presidential election. We use our estimates of the e ects of economic perceptions to understand how important the economy was in this presidential election. The estimates on our ideological and issue distance variables give us the tools we need to understand the e ects of spatial placement on ideology and issues in this presidential election. Last, our estimates of the e ects of social, entitlement and taxation issues give us the ability to examine these other explanations for voter choice in the 1996 presidential election campaign.
Multinomial Probit Estimates of the 1996 Election
In Table 3 we present the multinomial probit estimates of our model which includes the ideological distance parameter. In Table 4 we present a virtually identical model, but here we include the issue distance parameters. 5 In each table, the estimates in the left column give the coe cients which express the e ect of each individual characteristic on the likelihood of the respondent voting for Clinton relative to the likelihood of voting for Perot. The right column gives coe cients for the e ect of each individual characteristic on the relative likelihood of choosing Dole versus choosing Perot.
Tables 3 and 4 Go Here
In the ideological distance model (Table 3) we see rst that ideological distance is negatively signed and is statistically signi cant. This indicates that voters were less likely to support candidates who were further from them ideologically, all other things being equal. In the results for Clinton relative to Perot, we see that a number of other coe cients are statistically signi cant. Not surprisingly we nd that Democrats were more likely to vote for Clinton than Perot; also those who wanted to increase Social Security expenditures and those who were opposed to Dole's tax cut were more likely to support Clinton than Perot. We also nd that voters who were pro{choice were more likely to vote for Clinton than were pro{life voters. And, in con rmation of our hypothesis regarding the e ects of the national economy on support for Clinton we see that the national economy variable had a strong and positive e ect on support for Clinton relative to Perot.
Turning to the results for Dole support in Table 3 , we see that in this speci cation a similar set of variables were strongly related to Dole support. On one hand we see that Republicans were signi cantly more likely to support Dole than Perot. We also nd that both those who wanted to cut welfare bene ts and those who did believed that the private sector should supply health care coverage were more likely to support Dole. Last, we nd that pro{life voters were signi cantly more likely to support Dole.
We see very similar results in Table 4 . Here we see that adding the issue distance variables does improve our ability to understand the outcome of the 1996 presidential election, since we see that in addition to ideological distance, that both government services and environmental regulation were both signi cant and negatively related to Clinton support. As to the other substantively important predictors of Clinton voting we see that in this speci cation only Democratic partisanship and the perceptions of voters about the state of the national economy are now signi cantly related to Clinton support relative to Perot. The coe cients on social security, abortion, and the tax cut are no longer signi cant; and the tax cut coe cient even changes sign.
For Dole, furthermore, we see in the issue and ideological distance speci cation that welfare cuts, pro{life beliefs, and private sector provision of health care are signi cant predictors of Dole voting. Beside a signi cant e ect for partisanship, we now see that the estimated impact of the 15% tax cut is now statistically signi cant in this speci cation (signi cance here is at the 90% level, with a one{tailed test). We also see that a respondents' gender has no signi cant e ect on their vote-choice once we control for the issues and demographic variables included in our model. This is consistent with recent work by Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler showing that the gender-gap can be explained by issue-positions of voters and candidates (Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler 1997) .
These multinomial probit results give us one way to assess the di erent explanations for the 1996 presidential election. We nd support rst of all for the proposition that the national economy had a strong e ect on voter choice in this election. Also we nd support for the idea that spatial position on some issues (government services and environmental regulation) and ideology were signi cant predictors of candidate support. Last we see that a number of other important issues | concerning changes in entitlement policy, in federal government taxation, and abortion policy | were themselves signi cant predictors of candidate voting in the 1996 presidential election.
The Magnitude of the E ects of the Independent Variables
However, since these estimated e ects translate into individual probabilities of candidate support in a complex and nonlinear manner, we need to transform these coe cient estimates into probabilities to help in our interpretation of the relative magnitude of each type of e ect on this election. Thus, we rst turn to estimating \ rst di erences" in Table 5 . In this table we present the predicted probabilities of candidate support for Clinton, Dole and Perot, for di erent values of speci c independent variables. For each of the independent variables for which we calculate probability di erences, we rst give the estimated probability for the high value of the variable, followed by the same probability of candidate support for the low value of the independent variable. The last entry for each speci c independent variable is the di erence between these two probability estimates. To calculate these probability di erences we set all of the other independent variables to their sample mode values. 6 Table 5 Goes Here
The rst two entries in Table 5 show how much more important the state of the national economy was in determining voter choice in 1996 than were perceptions of personal nances. Changes in a respondent's perception of their personal nances produced very slight changes in the probability that the hypothetical voter would support each of the candidates. However, notice that changes in perceptions of the national economy produced very large changes in both Clinton and Dole support. The hypothetical voter was .38 more likely to support Clinton if they saw the national economy was better rather than worse; the hypothetical voter was .31 more likely to support Dole if they saw the national economy was worse, not better.
Next, we see from Table 5 that opinions on cuts in both entitlement programs had strong impacts on candidate support. A voter who wanted to increase either programs would be .14 or .08 more likely to support Clinton (Social Security and welfare, respectively). But a voter who wanted to cuts either programs was more likely to support Dole than a voter who wanted increases in either program (.08 and .18 more likely for Social Security and welfare, respectively). These two issues had less of an impact on voting for Perot, since those wanting cuts in Social Security were more likely to vote for Perot than those wanting increases in that entitlement program; while voters who wanted increases in welfare programs were .10 more likely to vote for Perot than those wanting welfare program cuts.
Dole did receive some support from his 15% tax cut proposal. Those who favoted the tax cut were .12 more likely to support Dole than those who opposed it. Opposing the tax cut led voters to support Clinton by only .07 more than those who supported the tax cut. Similarly, opposing the tax cut led voters to be slightly more likely to support Perot (.05) than those who supported the 15% tax cut.
Both abortion and health insurance beliefs had strong e ects in the 1996 election. Pro{choice beliefs made our hypothetical voter .30 more likely to support Clinton than pro{life voters. Pro{ life beliefs, though, made voters .12 more likely to support Dole. Similarily, those who wanted the government to provide health insurance were .12 more likely to support Clinton than those who wanted the private sector to provide health insurance, and also .13 more likely to support Perot. The opposite relationship is seen for Dole, since our hypothetical voter was .25 more likely to vote for Dole if they believed that the private sector should provide health care coverage and not the government.
4 E ects of Candidate Spatial Locations
Thus far we have demonstrated that respondents' views of the issues played a strong role in determining voter choice in the 1996 presidential election. Here we want to pursue a di erent question on the importance of issues in this election by focusing on where the candidates were located on the six issues and ideology in our analysis. We are also interested here in trying to determine what the ideal location for each candidate on each of these issues and ideology might have been.
To answer each of these questions we follow a simulation procedure used by Alvarez and Nagler in their analysis of the 1992 election (Alvarez and Nagler 1995) . To determine the e ects of candidate behavior with regard to issue and ideological positioning, we simulate the e ect of each candidate moving across the issue or ideological space, holding the positions of the other two candidates constant. In this simulation, we compute the probability of each respondent voting for each of the three candidates as we move the candidate of interest across the issue or ideological space, from 1 to 7, by increments of .02. We then aggregate the estimated probabilities from all respondents for each candidate at each possible position. This gives us estimated vote shares at each possible position.
We begin our analysis by presenting graphically these results for ideological placements. The results given in Figures 1-3 show the predicted vote share of each candidate (on the vertical axis) as Clinton (Figure 1 ), Dole ( Figure 2 ) and Perot (Figure 3 ) are moved across the ideological space. Beginning with Figure 1 , what is striking to note is that Clinton actually had a fair amount of exibility in where he could locate himself in the ideological space. The maximum of his vote share curve occurs when he is located at 4.24 on the seven point scale, where he could have received as high a vote share as 50.3%; however, respondents actually perceived Clinton to be at 3.15, where he gets 48.7% of the vote. Thus, while Clinton was not located very far from his ideal ideological position, he could have shifted slightly further to the right and obtained more votes, ceteris paribus. in a di erent election outcome. Dole was perceived by respondents to be located at 5.15 on this ideological scale, where he received 41.4% of the vote. We calculate his optimal position to be 4.60, just slightly to the left of his actual position, where he could have received just a slightly greater vote share (41.7%). Virtually the same story holds for Perot, since at no ideological position does he come close to even beating Dole. We calculate from our model that Perot's optimal position was 4.36, where he could have received 9.9% of the total vote | which is equivalent to the 9.9% of the vote share he obtained from his actual position (4.49).
We replicate this analysis, but with less detail, for ideology and all of the remaining placement issues, in Table 6 . The rst three lines of this table provide a summary of the results for ideology, which we just discussed. Considering the rest of the issues, however, we see that there was not a great deal of issue positioning latitude which any of the three candidates really had in this election. Recall that the statistically signi cant issue distance parameters in our multinomial probit model were government services and environmental regulation. For even these two issues, where we estimated the largest e ects on voter preference, it is clear that the candidates were not far from their optimal positions. None of the three candidates could have obtained more that a percentage or two of additional vote share by moving to their optimal position on any of these particular issues. Table 6 goes here However, this does not imply that if these three candidates could have determined their optimal position on all of these issues and ideology that they could have signi cantly improved their vote shares. In Table 7 we use the optimal placements we just calculated above to determine what the maximal change in vote share would have been if any one of these candidates could have moved to their issue and ideological optimum, ceteris paribus. Table 7 we see that there could have been some dramatic changes in candidate vote shares is each of the candidates could have moved to their optimal positions, holding the other candidates constant. Clinton, for example, could have increased his vote share by a full ve percent by simultaneously moving to his optimal position on all issues and ideology. Also, notice that Dole would have increased his vote share by almost three percent by moving to his optimal location.
But by far the biggest increase is seen for Perot, whose vote share would have jumped over ve percent had he been able simultaneously to his ideal ideological and issue location.
Thus, this evidence leads us to conclude that in general, the candidates were positioned relatively optimally in the ideological and issue space. On an issue{by{issue basis, we could nd little support for the idea that any of the candidates were very far from their ideal positions. And when we moved each candidate to their ideological and issue optimal placements simultaneously, we did see some change in the vote shares of each candidate, but not enough change to have signi cantly altered the outcome of the 1996 presidential election.
E ects of the Economy
This leads us to the other major factor which in uenced voter behavior in the 1996 election | economic perceptions. Our methodology provides us the ability to examine another important counterfactual question, following the sort of questions Alvarez and Nagler (1995) asked about the 1992 presidential election. In particular, what if the state of the national economy had been signi cantly di erent in 1996? Would Dole have been able to win the 1996 election if voters perceived the national economy and their own personal nances in the same negative light in 1996 as they had in 1992?
In Table 8 we present the frequency of each the two major survey responses regarding the economy, each taken from the 1988, 1992 and 1996 NES. What we nd about the aggregate distributions of opinions about both the national economy and personal nances in 1996 is that they were remarkably similar to those in 1988. The distribution of opinions about changes in personal nance are virtually identical in 1988 and 1996; however the assessments of the national economy are, on balance, slightly more favorable in 1996 than in 1988. Table 8 goes here But what actually is important to observe about the results in Table 8 is how di erent 1992 was relative to both 1988 and 1996. There is no question, based on these survey marginals, that the electorate was in a sour economy mood in 1992, which perhaps is a large part of the story behind Bush's loss (Alvarez and Nagler 1995) . The opinions about the change in personal nances are somewhat more negative in 1992 than in either of the other years, but certainly, it is clear that the perceptions of the national economy were dramatically di erent in 1996 than in 1992 or 1988. A full 72% of American voters believed the national economy had grown worse under the last year of Bush's administration.
So, while we have found that the national economy had a strong e ect in returning Clinton to o ce in 1996, what would have happened if the economy had been performing poorly in the year leading up to this election? More speci cally, what might the results have been if the election in 1996 were held under the same economic conditions which helped to push Clinton to victory in 1992? To provide an answer to this question, we provide counterfactual estimates of candidate vote shares under three di erent scenarios in Table 9 . There, we simulate these hypothetical election outcomes by randomly reassigning opinions about the economy to the 1996 respondents so that the aggregate distributions of opinions about the economy matched the 1992 aggregate distributions of opinion about the economy. This gives us the chance to compute the probability of voting for each candidate using these hypothetical values for the economic perception variables, and the respondents' actual values for all of the other variables. Table 9 goes here In Table 9 we see that changing had voters seen their personal nances in 1996 to be the same as those they might have had in 1992 does not change the election outcome. But in the third row of this table, it is clear that had the national economy been seen by voters as being as bad in 1996 as it was in 1992, Clinton would have lost this election by a large margin. Not only could Clinton have lost to Dole by a considerable margin (about ten percentage points), Perot's vote share would have risen to just under 15%. Thus, the conclusion is inescapable; just as the weak economy in 1992 doomed the incumbent president to retirement, the strong economy in 1996 granted another incumbent president four more years in o ce.
6 The Impact of Candidate Perot
In 1992, when Perot received roughly 20% of the popular vote, it was a very important question as to whether his presence in the election campaign hurt Bush worse than Clinton. Alvarez and Nagler (1995) showed that Perot drew support from both Bush and Clinton virtually equally. This led them to make a strong substantive claim about the 1992 election, which was that despite the fact that Perot's presence slightly increased Clinton's victory margin, Bush would still have lost the 1992 election.
Still, in 1996 Perot captured about 10% of all the votes cast, which indicates that he is still a considerable force on the national political scene. If these voters had not been presented with a choice of Perot, and if they had still turned out to vote in this election, who would they have cast ballots for? And could Dole have beaten Clinton in a Perot{free political environment? Out multinomial probit model gives us one way to try to answer this question. Here, we reproduce our counterfactual simulations for both issue and economic factors, but we implicitly exclude Perot from the choice set by simply computing the two party vote share under the assumption that each voter would simply cast their vote for Clinton or Dole, depending on which candidate they had the greatest utility for. Using this approach, we estimate a two party vote breakdown of 52.4% for Clinton and 47.6% for Dole, a margin of just under ve percent.
Next, we examine who much di erent this two party vote share might have been if each candidate could have positioned themselves at their optimal position (Table 10 ) and under the scenario that the economy in 1996 was as bad as it was in 1992 (Table 11) . Beginning with the issue placement simulation, we see that if Clinton were to move to his optimal position on ideology and each issue that he would gain a percentage or two over Dole. But note that if Clinton were to move simultaneously to his optimal position on ideology and all issues he could have swept to a very large victory. Tables 10 and 11 go here On an issue{by{issue basis, though, we do not see Dole gaining much ground on Clinton. Yet in the end, if Dole had been able to position himself at his optimal position on ideology and all of the issues he could have gotten himself into a 49.7% versus 50.3% race | or a virtual tie. So, without Perot in the mix and by being slightly closer to the median voter on ideology and all of these di erent issues, Dole could have brought himself to a virtual tie of Clinton.
Next, though, what about the e ect of the economy in Perot's absence? We present in Table 11 a counterfactual simulation in which we examine the same three hypothetical scenarios as earlier in this paper (setting the electorate's aggregate economic opinions in 1996 to match those in 1992), but in a situation where Perot is on the sidelines. We see that the e ects of personal nances are virtually zero, just as in the three candidate race. But we see that were the national economy as bad in 1996 as it was in 1992, and if Perot were not running in the election, Dole would have easily won the 1996 presidential election, by roughly a seven percent margin.
Conclusions and Discussion
Our analysis of the 1996 presidential election leads to a number of important conclusions about contemporary American politics. First, we again nd that the state of the national economy played an extremely important role in determining the outcome of this election. This echoes the interpretations of the 1992 election, in which the adverse reactions by most American voters to the state of the national economy were seen as a fundamental component of Clinton's victory (Alvarez and Nagler 1995) . But it is not the case that the e ect of the national economy in 1992 was an anomaly | rather, we see that there was a consistently strong e ect of the national economy in both 1992 (and in Clinton's defeat of Bush) and in 1996 (and in Clinton's reelection victory). Had the national economy been weaker the 1996 presidential election could have gone either way.
Secondly, while the national economy did play a very strong role in the 1996 election, other social and economic issues were also very important in determining the election outcome. As in 1992, there is a strong and consistent impact of abortion beliefs in the 1996 presidential election as well. In fact, in both the bivariate and multivariate analysis of the e ects of abortion beliefs on voting in the 1996 election it seems that abortion played a slightly stronger role in the 1996 election than it had just four years previously. Thus, while the 1992 campaign might have helped make abortion a salient and clearly de ned distinction between Republican and Democratic candidates, it seems that the intervening four years and the 1996 campaign only helped to solidify this strong division in American politics. And, when the e ects of issues are considered, respondents' gender did not in uence vote choice.
But the politics of entitlement and tax reform also played an important role in the 1996 presidential race. One of the major planks of the Dole platform was his focus on a 15% tax cut; we have shown that plank had only a minor e ect on his support. The nexus of three other important entitlement programs | social security, welfare, and government{sponsored health care | each played minor roles in determining voter choice in the 1996 presidential election. Thus, the events of Clinton's rst term in o ce, from the failed e orts to reform health care in America to the signing of the welfare reform bill, did in uence how voters cast their ballots in 1996. But we do not nd evidence that any one of these entitlement or tax reform measures dominated the others in driving voter decisionmaking; nor do we nd that any one of these economic factors were more important than the state of the national economy in in uencing the outcome of this presidential election.
Third, what were the e ect of the second Perot candidacy? Our results here show that the factors which drove almost 10% of American voters to support Perot in 1996 were quite complex. On one hand, the robust state of the national economy eliminated that as possible grounds for a strong showing by an insurgent non{major party candidate. But, Perot's calls for scal responsibility by the federal government did seem to resonate with some voters, since cutting social security and opposition to the Dole tax cut were both factors which had some e ect on voter choice for Perot. In the end, though, no single entitlement, scal or social issue in this election drove many voters to support Perot.
Yet we do see that Perot had other e ects on the 1996 presidential election. Our results show that, just as in 1992, Perot seems to siphon more supporters from the Republican than from the Democratic column. In both elections, without Perot in the race, Dole and Bush could have made a much stronger showing | and have thus made each election much more closely contested. Our results show that if Perot were not in the race, Dole would have signi cantly increased his vote share if he were able to move to the center on a range of issues. We do not interpret our results here as showing that if Perot had not been in the 1996 race that Dole could have won the election, since the strong national economy and the e ects of entitlement reform and social issues worked strongly for the Democratic incumbent president.
Last, we have used a methodological technique | multinomial probit | to study this three{ candidate election. This empirical approach for studying multiparty or multicandidate elections is relatively new in the political science literature. The exibility of this methodological technique, especially the fact that it imposes the least restrictions on the way in which voters make their decisions, underscores that this is the preferred choice for empirical research on multiparty and multicandidate elections . The fact that this empirical technique can allow us to answer so many questions about contemporary American politics should make it of great interest to all who wish to understand political behavior and public opinion. 20 1. In this table we report the row percentages, so while the rows will sum to 100% the columns will not. Armed with the number of respondents in each cell, interested readers can calculate the column percentages.
2. We use Bush and Clinton as the candidates in 1994.
3. Other techniques could be used to estimate a multivariate model of the 1996 presidential election: estimate binomial choice models, ordinal models, or multinomial logit models. Each of these techniques is awed for estimating models of multicandidate elections (Alvarez 1997; Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 1997) .
4. Below we present results which estimate two of the three error covariance matrices, consistent with the standard results in the literature on the identi cation of these model parameters Bolduc 1992; Bunch 1991; Keane 1992 ).
5. We estimated a model which included only the issue distance parameters but we do not present that here. The results are substantively equivalent.
6. Each of the issue and ideological distance variables were set to their sample mean values. We used more substantively plausible values for the other demographic and issue preference variables; the modal respondent was male, older than 60, lived in the south, had a high school education, was politically independent, thought that welfare should be cut but social security should remain constant, saw the national economy as better but their personal nances as unchanged, did not support the Dole 15% tax cut, was middle{of{the road on government support for health care, and thought that abortion should be permitted only in limited situations. 
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